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In this thesis, we study the growth eects of taxation in a general two-sector
endogenous growth model. We examines in particular how these eects depend on
the elasticities of substitution between the factors in the nal goods and human
capital production. We nd that the negative eects of taxation on economic
growth are stronger when the elasticities of substitution between inputs are higher
in both sectors. Under reasonable parameterization, for equal percentage changes,
the labor income tax has a larger eect on growth than the capital income tax
because the former has a larger tax base than the later. For revenue-equivalent
changes, the magnitudes of the growth eects of the taxes depend on the elasticities
of substitution: (i) when the elasticities are low, the capital income tax (the
consumption tax) has a larger (smaller) eect on growth than the labor income
tax; (ii) when the elasticities are high, the labor income tax (the consumption tax)
has a larger (smaller) eect on growth than the capital income tax.
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1 Introduction
The eect of taxation on economic growth is a key issue in the literature on tax-
ation and growth. A large number of papers in the literature have investigated
the growth eect of tax policies/reforms in the context of neoclassical models and
endogenous growth models. Using neoclassical growth models, in which physical
capital is the only accumulable factor, many studies (e.g.,Judd (1987); Auerbach
and Kotliko (1987); Lucas (1990)) nd that both capital and labor income taxes
reduce the steady-state level of income but have only transitory eects on its rate
of growth. Compared with labor income taxes, capital income taxes are more
distortionary. A capital income tax creates an inter-temporal distortion by reduc-
ing the return to savings, because it eectively taxes future consumption at an
increasing rate, while a labor income tax aects only the allocation of time be-
tween labor and leisure that is an intratemporal distortion. Lucas (1990) provides
an analytical review of research on growth eects of capital taxation using neo-
classical growth models. He nds that eliminating the capital tax and raising the
labor tax in revenue-neutral way would have a trivial eect on the US growth rate.
The more recent literature on taxation and growth reconsider the impact of tax-
ation on economic growth in endogenous growth models where both physical and
human capital can be accumulated (e.g., King and Rebelo (1990); Rebelo (1991);
Pecorino (1993); Devereux and Love (1994, 1995); Stokey and Rebelo (1995)).
King and Rebelo (1990) show that in a two-sector endogenous growth model, na-
tional policies, such as taxation policies, can aect long-run growth rate. They
argue that, modest variations in tax rates are associated with large variations in
long-run growth rates. Calibrating their model using US data, they claim that
taxes can easily shut down the growth process, leading to development traps in
which countries stagnate or even regress for lengthy periods. Another paper by
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Rebelo (1991) analyzes a class of endogenous growth models with constant-return-
to-scale production function and concludes that the growth rate would be rela-
tively low for countries in which there are high income tax rates. An increase in
the income tax rate decreases the rate of return to the investment activities of the
private sector and leads to a permanent decline in the rate of capital accumulation
and in the rate of growth.
Devereux and Love (1994) examine the eects of factor taxation in a discrete two
sector model. They look at the eects of taxes both in the steady state and during
the transition to the steady state. They nd that both consumption and factor
income taxes lower the growth rate and for equal percentage changes, labor in-
come taxes have larger eects on growth than capital income taxes; however, for
revenue-equivalent changes, the dierences in the growth rate for dierent taxes
are negligible.
In endogenous growth models with human capital accumulation, the impacts of
taxation on economic growth are closely related to two factors. The rst one is
whether physical inputs are required in producing human capital. The second one
is whether human capital accumulation is considered as a market activity (and
thus these physical inputs are taxed) or a nonmarket activity (and thus these
physical inputs are untaxed). Assuming physical inputs are used and taxed in hu-
man capital production, King and Rebelo (1990) nd that the eects of taxation
depend critically on the production technology for new human capital. Pecorino
(1993) considers the mixes of taxes on physical and human capital in a growth
model with human capital accumulation and nds that factor intensities play an
important role in determining the eect of the tax structure on growth. Devereux
and Love (1994) assume that physical capital used in human capital production is
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untaxed and examine the eects of taxation in a model with joint accumulation of
physical and human capital. They nd that all three types of taxes (consumption,
labor income and capital income taxes) reduce the growth rate. Milesi-Ferretti
and Roubini (1998) show that factor taxation hurts long-run growth regardless of
whether human capital production is taxable.
One limitation of many studies in the literature is the assumption that the elastic-
ity of substitution equals to unity and thus the production function takes the Cobb-
Douglas form. In previous studies, the Cobb-Douglas production functions have
been widely used for goods and human capital production. The Cobb-Douglas
production function is extremely restrictive as it sets the elasticity of substitution
between factors to unity. However, many empirical studies nd that the elastic-
ities of substitution between production factors is less than unity. At the same
time, there also exists empirical evidence that shows that this elasticity is greater
than unity.1
The elasticity of substitution is central to many questions in growth theory. It is
one of the determinants of economic growth, and it also aects the speed of con-
vergence as well as the aggregate income distribution (see, e.g., Grandville (1989),
Klump and Grandville (2000), Klump and Preissler (2000) and Hick (1932)). Sev-
eral studies in the literature have investigated the connection between economic
growth and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology,
which allows the elasticity of substitution to take constant values that are either
greater or lower than one. For example, Klump and Preissler (2000) use dierent
variants of the CES function in a neoclassical growth model to examine how eco-
nomic growth is related to the elasticity of substitution. They show that a higher
elasticity of substitution makes the emergence of permanent growth more probable
1See Section 4 for detailed discussion.
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and can lead to a higher long-run growth rate. However, they do not consider the
taxation eects on growth under dierent variants of the CES function.
The contributions in the literature on taxation with implications of production
structures includes Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995), among others.
Lucas (1990) considers the CES production function in physical capital production
(with substitution elasticity equal 0.6) to discuss the growth eects of taxation.
His focus is not on the elasticity of substitution but on other parameters. Stokey
and Rebelo (1995) show that the factor shares, depreciation rates, the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution and elasticity of labor supply are important for deter-
mining the quantitative impact of taxes, but the tax reform have little or no eects
on the US growth rate. They claim the elasticity of substitution in production is
relatively unimportant.2
The objective of this thesis is to develop a two-sector endogenous growth model
to examine the long-run growth eects of the three commonly used taxes (con-
sumption, capital and labor income taxes) under dierent assumptions concerning
the elasticities of substitution between inputs in nal goods and human capital
production.
We show the following results through numerical simulations: First, the negative
eects of factor income taxes on economic growth are stronger when the elasticities
of substitution between inputs in nal goods and human capital production are
higher, because, with high elasticities of substitution, taxation will have a lager
distortionary eect on the economy. Second, for equal percentage changes, the
labor income tax has a larger eect on growth than the capital income tax, be-
2In the previous studies, very few attempts have been made to consider the implications of
non-Cobb-Douglas human capital production functions for the growth eects of taxation.
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cause the labor's share of income exceeds the capital's share, which is reminiscent
of the result in Devereux and Love (1994). Third, for revenue-equivalent changes,
the magnitudes of the growth eects of the taxes depend on the elasticities of
substitution: (i) when the elasticities are low, the ranking of the taxes in terms
of the growth eects (starting with the largest eect) is: the capital income tax,
the labor income tax and the consumption tax; (ii) when the elasticities are high,
the ranking of the taxes is: the labor income tax, the capital income tax and the
consumption tax. This is dierent from the results in Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
They argue that the elasticity of substitution in production is relatively unimpor-
tant.
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a two sector endogenous
growth model. The model extends the framework in Ramsey model by considering
endogenous labor supply and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
technology. The two sectors are nal goods production and human capital produc-
tion. In the model, both labor (human capital) and physical capital are used in
production in the two sectors. Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium
and derive two key equilibrium conditions. Section 4 numerically investigates how
taxes aect the equilibrium growth rate under dierent assumptions concerning
the elasticities of substitution in the two sectors. The main ndings and conclu-
sions are given in section 5.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and populated by many innitely-lived, rational, and iden-
tical households with homothermic preferences, many competitive rms with iden-
tical technology and a government. Population remains xed over time. There
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are two sectors in which production takes place: nal goods and human capital;
and two factors of production: physical capital and human capital. Both factors
are necessary for production in both sectors.
A single consumption good is produced in this economy from a technology that
combines physical capital (K) and (eective) labor (H (1  l)). Physical capital
is obtained from unconsumed nal goods.
Human capital is embodied within individuals, so that it is useful only if combined
with time spent at work by households. Human capital is produced in the human
capital sector. Both human capital and physical capital are assumed to be able
to grow without bound.
Each household has one unit of time endowment and allocates it to leisure l, la-
bor (1  l), and education (1  l) (1  ). That is, the household allocates its
time between income-generating activities and all other activities (leisure), also
allocates income-generating time between production of goods and accumulation
of human capital (learning) and distributes income between consumption and in-
vestment (saving).
All markets are perfectly competitive.
2.1 Households
Households deriving their utility from consuming a single produced good and
leisure, over an innite time horizon. The discounted sum of future utilities of the














 > 0 ( 6= 1);  > 0;  > 0; (1)
where Ct and lt are consumption and leisure at time t;  is the rate of time
preference; 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; and  reects the
household's preferences for leisure. The household is endowed with one unit of
time, so (1  l) is the amount of time spent on the income-generating activities.
It is assumed that any taxes are levied on the nal goods sector only. Hours not
consumed in leisure may be devoted to either production in the market sector
or human capital formation. Hours supplied to the market earn a direct market
wage. If hours are devoted to human capital formation, they generate a return
in the future when wages per hour are augmented by a higher productivity of time.
Assume that households directly save in terms of capital, renting out capital to
rms at competitive interest rates. In choosing among saving, consumption and
hours supplied to the market, households face the following constraint:
(1 + c)C = (1  l)w (1  l)H+ (1  k) rK   E   _K   kK + T; (2)
and
l < 1;
where c l , k , and T are, respectively, a consumption tax, a wage tax, a capital
income tax, and a lump-sum transfer from the government. The tax on human
capital is a wage tax. The taxing authority does not distinguish between the re-
turns to raw labor and human capital. The wage w represents the return to hours
measured in the eciency units. r is the rental rate on physical capital. H is the
total stock of human capital. (1  l) is the time spent in the income-generating
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activities and  is the fraction of this time supplied to the market. (1  l) rep-
resents hours supplied to the nal goods sector. E is the physical inputs in the
human capital sector.
Human capital production requires the use of both physical inputs and (eective)
labor. Human capital is produced according to:
_H = B

 (H (1  l) (1  ))  1 + (1  )E  1
 
 1   hH: (3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution; h is the human capital depreciation rate;
E is the household's investment of physical inputs; B is the productivity parame-
ter; and  is the share parameter that measures the importance of physical inputs
relative to the eective units of time inputs.
2.2 Final Goods Production
Firms in the market sector simply rent capital and employ labor to maximize








This technology for nal goods production is a CES (constant elasticity of substi-
tution) production function, which allows physical capital and human capital to
be either complements or substitutes depending upon the value of the elasticity
of substitution.3 In (4), Y is output; A is a productivity parameter; K is physical
3One useful property of the CES production function is that it nests a number of famous
simple cases. When the elasticity of substitution  converges to 0, we have the Leontief produc-
tion function Y = AminfK ; L(1 )g . When the elasticity of substitution  is 1, we have the
Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AKL(1 ). When the elasticity of substitution  goes
to innity, we have the linear production function Y = A (K + (1  )L).
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capital;  is the share parameter that measures the importance of physical capital
relative to eective labor; and  determines the elasticity of substitution of inputs,
labor and capital are complements if  < 1 and substitutes if  > 1.

























where w and r are the wage rate and the interest rate, respectively.
The market clearing condition for the nal good gives the law of motion for physical
capital stock:
_K = Y   C   E   kK; (7)
where k is the physical capital depreciation rate.
2.3 Government
Government is introduced into this economy in a very minimal fashion. We ab-
stract from government spending and simply assume that all tax revenue is rebated
in a lump-sum transfer. Letting T denote this transfer, we have
T = krK + lw (1  l)H+ cC: (8)
We assume that the government only has access to distortionary taxes (at at
rates): a capital income tax k, a labor income tax l and a consumption tax c.
In the literature on taxation, it is generally assumed that the tax revenue is used
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for a single type of government expenditures (normally lump-sum transfers).
For simplicity, we assume that the government balances its budget at each point
in time, thus avoiding any unnecessary notational burden associated with govern-
ment debt.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we will rst characterize the competitive equilibrium. We will
then numerically investigate the growth eects of various taxes and compare the
magnitudes of these growth eects under dierent tax policies and dierent values
of the elasticity of substitution.
Without distortions, the competitive equilibrium under perfect foresight is Pareto
optimal. In this thesis, we focus on the equilibrium conditions that determine the
steady-state growth rate.
To characterize the competitive equilibrium, in this case, we simply think of the
economy as having prefect competitive markets for all goods and factors. Firms
make their production decisions seeking to maximize prots, while households rent
the two factors of production to rms, make learning decisions and choose their
leisure time and consumption so as to maximize their lifetime utility.
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium: Denition
A competitive equilibrium for the economy constructed above consists of the
sequences of consumption, leisure, physical capital, fraction of time spent on
working, human capital, investment in education, lump-sum transfer, tax rates,
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wages, and rental rates fC(t); l(t); K(t), (t), H(t), E(t), T(t), k(t), l(t), c(t),
w(t); r(t)g1t=0 that satisfy the following conditions:
(i). Household utility maximization
Maximize (1), subject to (2), (3), Ct > 0, lt < 1 and relevant transversality
conditions: limt!1 e ttKt = 0 and limt!1 e ttHt = 0;
(ii). Prots maximization;
(iii). Government budget constraint;
(iv). Market clearing condition (7)
_K = Y   C   E   kK:
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium: Characterization
We now characterize the competitive equilibrium, starting with constructing the














where  and  are the co-state variables associated with the household's budget
constraint (2) and human capital production technology (3).
The rst-order conditions for this optimization problem are:
@H
@C
= (Cl)  l    (1 + c) = 0; (10)
@H
@l
= (Cl)  Cl 1    (1  l)wH  BH (1  )


 (H (1  l) (1  ))  1 + (1  )E  1
 1
 1




=  (1  l)w (1  l)H   BH (1  l)


 (H (1  l) (1  ))  1 + (1  )E  1
 1
 1
[H (1  l) (1  )]  1 = 0; (12)
@H
@E
=  + B (1  )








_ =   (1  k) r + k + ; (14)
_ =   (1  l)w (1  l)  B (1  l) (1  )


 (H (1  l) (1  ))  1 + (1  )E  1
 1
 1
[H (1  l) (1  )]  1 + h + :
(15)
The system of equations (3) and (7), along with (10)-(15), implicitly determines
the solution sequence for the model's variables.
Equation(10) represents the household's choice of consumption. The rst term is
the marginal benet of consumption, and the second term is the marginal cost of
consumption. The solution for the household's consumption decision must satisfy
the condition that the marginal benet of consumption equals to the marginal
cost of consumption. According to equation (11), the optimal allocation of the
household's time is such that the gain in utility from leisure equals to the loss in
utility from the time spent on working and learning. The rst term of equation
(11) is the marginal utility of leisure. The second and third terms represent the
marginal benet from working and learning through earning more income for pri-
vate consumption (the disutility of labor supply). Equation(12) is a condition that
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determines the optimal allocation of labor between production of nal goods and
accumulation of human capital; The rst term is the marginal benet of working
in the nal good sector while the second term is the marginal cost of working in
the nal good sector (in terms of the benet of education). Equation (13) gives the
optimal investment in education; The rst term is the marginal cost of investment
(the utility foregone) while the second term is the marginal benet of investment
in the human capital sector.
Equations (14) and (15) are the conditions that determine the optimal paths of
the shadow prices of physical and human capital (dynamic eciency of resource
allocation). The  and  are shadow prices of physical capital and human capital
respectively. These are the Euler conditions determining the optimal accumula-
tion of physical and human capital as functions of their separate returns.





(1  l)wH : (16)
This equation represents the trade-o between goods consumption and leisure.
The left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between goods consump-
tion and leisure, while the right hand side is the inverse of the real wage after
adjustment for consumption and wage taxes.
From (5), (6), (10),(12) and (13), we obtain
"
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This equation says that the allocation of factors between the two sectors is opti-
mal when the after-tax marginal rates of technical substitution between the two
factors are equalized across sector.
From the above equations, we can see that all the three types of taxes (consump-
tion taxes, wage taxes and capital income taxes) aect the allocation of resources.
A consumption tax drives a wedge between the marginal rates of substitution of
consumption for leisure and the real wage rate. A wage tax has the same eect as
the consumption tax. In addition, from equations (12) and (13), we can see that
the wage tax also aects the returns to human capital accumulation by distorting
the inter-sectoral allocation of time and physical capital. A tax on capital income
aects the incentive to invest in nal goods production. As shown in (17), the
capital income tax aects the returns to both human capital accumulation and
physical capital accumulation by causing the re-allocation of physical capital be-
tween sectors as described in equations (12) and (15).
Now we follow the approach used in the literature (e.g., King and Rebelo (1990),
Rebelo (1991) and Devereux and love (1994)) to investigate the properties of the
steady-state equilibrium.
To examine the properties of the steady-state equilibrium in this two-sector econ-
omy, we use the equilibrium conditions (10)-(15) to derive two conditions that
determine the equilibrium growth rate (g) and labor supply (1  l). We deal with
this in three steps.

















that is, in steady state, physical capital, human capital, consumption, physical
investment in human accumulation and output all grow at the same rate.
Also, along a balanced growth path, we have _= = _=. That is, in equilibrium
the (shadow) prices of physical capital and human capital must change at the
same rate. As a result, we have the following equation (from equations (14) and
(15)):4
(1  k)r     k
= B(1 l)[(H(1 l)(1 ))  1 +(1 )E  1 ] 1 1 [H(1 l)(1 )]  1  h: (18)
The left hand side is the after-tax return on physical capital accumulation. It is
the marginal product of capital in the nal goods production sector. To satisfy
inter-temporal eciency, it must be equal to the return on human capital accumu-
lation, which is given by the right hand side. The return on human capital should
be [(1 l)w(1 l)+(  h)P ]
P
, where P is the relative price of human capital (in terms
of the price of physical capital). That is after-tax wage rate, multiplied by total
labor supply, eliminating the value of depreciated stock of human capital and time
amortization, all divided by the relative price of human capital (i.e. P = =).
We can get the relative price P of human capital from equation (12). Dividing
both sides of equation (13) by  and using the expression for P , we have the
atemporal eciency condition:
(1  l)w =  [H (1  l) (1  )]
  1

(1  )E  1 ; (19)
that is, the after-tax wage equals to the marginal product of eective labor in
human capital production. Substituting this condition and the expression for P
into the right hand side of equation (15) and dividing it by  gives the right hand
4The detailed derivations of the right side of this equation will be explained later.
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side of (18).







Using this condition, along with the human capital production technology (3), we
can rewrite equation (18) as



















+ g + h
!
B 1 (g + h) (1  l) 1 : (21)
Second, we derive the rst equation for the relationship between growth and total
labor supply from the market clearing condition. From (14), we have
g =
(1  k) r     k

: (22)
This is a familiar growth equation in the literature. The steady-state growth rate
depends positively on the after-tax rate of return to investment in physical capital
((1   k)r) and the elasticity of intertemproal substitution (1=) and negatively
on the household's subjective discount rate () and the capital depreciation rate
(k).
Dene y  Y
H(1 l) , k  KH(1 l) , c  CH(1 l) and e  EH(1 l) , where y is output
per unit of eective labor, k is physical capital per unit of eective labor, c is
consumption per unit of eective labor, and e is education investment per unit of
16

































































Rearranging (16), we have
C =
(1  l)wHl
(1 + c) 
: (24)










(1 + c)(1  l) ;
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 (g)(1 + c)(1  l) : (25)
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)(1     l)A1  1

35 [
(g)]  : (26)









We now rewrite the market clearing condition ( _K = Y   C   E   kK) as















and substitute (25), (26) and (27) into it to obtain the rst condition that relates
the growth rate to labor supply:"
1  
 (g)















 (g)(1 + c)(1  l) : (28)
Third, the human capital production function gives the following equation
_H
H (1  l) = B











 B  1  (1  )  1 = B  1 (1  ) e  1 : (29)
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Substituting (29) into (30), we obtain the second condition that relates the growth
rate to labor supply:
(1  ) 1 















The above two equilibrium conditions, (28) and (31), determine the equilibrium
values of the growth rate (g) and labor supply (1   l). In what follows, we use
these two conditions to investigate the following two issues: (i) How do tax policies
aect the growth rate? and (ii) How do the growth eects of taxes respond to
the elasticities of substitution between production factors in the nal good and
human capital production sectors? Since the two equations are highly non-linear,
we will not attempt to examine these issues analytically. Instead, we will perform
numerical simulations to answer these questions.
4 Growth Eects of Taxation: Numerical Re-
sults
4.1 Parameterization
To perform numerical simulations, we need to choose the values of the model's
parameters for the benchmark economy. There are three types of parameters:
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(i) preference parameters: ,  and ;
(ii) technology parameters: A, B, , , k, h,  and ;
(iii) tax parameters, c, k and l.
We choose the values of the model's parameters to mimic an economy similar
to the US economy. We rst choose the values of the model's parameters for a
benchmark economy, and then vary the values of some parameters such as the tax
policies and the elasticities of substitution to see how the tax policies inuence
the growth rate under dierent assumptions concerning the nal good and human
capital production technologies.
We set  = 2=3,  = 0:7,  = 0:05,  = 2, and k = h = 0:08. (These param-
eters are summarized in Table 1.) The value of the capital's share in nal goods
production ( = 2=3) and the value of the household's subjective discount rate
( = 0:05) are very close to those used in the literature (e.g., King and Rebelo
(1990)). The value of the elasticity of marginal utility ( = 2) and the depreciation
rates of physical and human capital (k = h = 0:08) are also in the range of values
used in the literature (e.g., Lucas (1990), Pecorino (1993), Kydland and Prescott
(1982), Jones et al (1993)).5 Since there is little precise information about the
human capital technology, we assume that  = 0:7, larger than the value used in
the King and Rebelo (1990) model.
5For the depreciation rate of physical capital, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Jones et
al (1993) use k = 0:1 as their estimate. Judd (1987) estimates k = 0:12, while Jorgenson
and Yun (1991) suggest a smaller value for k, near 0.06. The value of the depreciation rate of
human capital has been estimated in the applied labor economics literature. There is a variety of
evidence on the magnitude of the depreciation rate of human capital: Mincer's (1974) estimate
of h = 0:012 for individuals is the lowest one that we ever found. Haley (1976) reports the
estimates in the range of 3-4 percent. Heckman's (1976) estimates of h range from 4 percent
to 9 percent (but these estimates seem very sensitive to the specication of the model). Rosen's
(1976) estimates vary from 5 percent (high school graduates in 1960) to 19 percent (college
graduates in 1970). King and Rebelo (1990) use h = 0:1 as their estimate. Devereux and Love
(1994) assume the depreciation rates of physical and human capital to be the same across and
set them equal to 0.1. Because of the wide variance in these estimates, we set k=h=0.08.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
labor share in nal goods production  2/3
labor share in human capital production  0.7
time preference  0.05
elasticity of marginal utility  2
depreciation rate of physical capital k 0.08
depreciation rate of human capital h 0.08
Since our focus is on how the growth eects of taxation respond to the elasticities
of substitution between factors in the nal good and human capital sectors, we
need to carefully consider the values of these two elasticities ( and  ). A wide
range of values for these elasticities have been found and used in the literature.
Several empirical studies found that the elasticity of substitution () in goods pro-
duction is close to unity (e.g., Nadiri (1970), Griliches (1967)). Many theoretical
papers that examine the growth eects of taxation assume that the elasticity of
substitution is unity and thus employ Cobb-Douglas production functions (e.g.,
King and Rebelo (1990), Jones et al (1993)).
However, many empirical studies found that the elasticity of substitution is less
than unity. Kravis (1959) estimated  = 0:64 over the period 1900-1957. Arrow
et al. (1961) estimated  = 0:57 for 1909-1949 and Kendrick and Sato (1963)
estimated  = 0:58 for 1919-1960. Yuhn (1991) reports estimates in the range
of 0.078-0.763. Chirinko et al (2004) suggest a smaller value, near 0.44. Antras
(2004) uses  = 0:8 as their estimate. Klump et al (2007) estimate  = 0:6. Devesh
Raval (2011) estimates that  ranges from 42 percent to 67 percent. A number of
theoretical papers assume that the elasticity of substitution is less than one. For
example,  = 0:6 is used in Lucas (1990).
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Also, quite a few studies show that the elasticity of substitution is greater than
one. For example, using cross-state data, Chiswick (1979) estimated both pair-
wise elasticities range from 2.2 to 2.9 for 1909 and 1919. Berndt and Christensen
(1974) showed that the \shadow" elasticities of substitution varies from 1.2 to 2.7
for 1929, 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1968. More recently, Karagiannis et al (2004)
found that the elasticity is greater than one.
In addition to the elasticity of substitution in nal goods production (), we also
need to choose the value of the elasticity of substitution in human capital pro-
duction (). Unfortunately, very few attempts have been made to estimate this
elasticity. Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1992) used a value less than one for
this elasticity. Since we believe that labor and physical inputs are less substi-
tutable in education than in nal goods production, we assume that the elasticity
of substitution in human capital production () is less than that in nal goods
production ().
To consider a wide range of nal goods and human capital production technologies,
we will investigate the following ve cases:
(i) Both production functions are Cobb-Douglas ( = 1:0 and  = 1:0);
(ii) Both elasticities are less than unity ( = 0:5 and  = 0:3);
(iii) Both elasticities are greater than unity ( = 1:5 and  = 1:1);
(iv) The elasticity in nal goods production is greater than unity while the
human capital production function is Cobb-Douglas ( = 1:4 and  = 1:0);
(v) The nal goods production function is Cobb-Douglas while the elasticity
in human capital production is less than unity ( = 1:0 and  = 0:6).
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The two productivity parameters, A and B, are then set so as to achieve the de-
sired trend growth rate in the benchmark economy. We follow Devereux and Love
(1994) to choose a growth rate of 2 percent after tax. Then without taxes, we set
the growth rate at 4 percent.
The importance of leisure  (along with the productivity parameter A and B)
should be set so as to satisfy the following two conditions (i) the trend growth
rate is set equal to around 4 percent without taxation; and (ii) households spend
about 40 percent of their time for leisure.6 The values of A, B and  are reported
in Table 2.
For the tax policy parameters in the benchmark economy, we follow Devereux and
Love (1994) to assume that there is no consumption taxes, and that both the labor
and capital income tax are 20%.
Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values and the Equilibrium Growth Rate
elasticity of substitution g l value of parameters
 = 1:5,  = 1:1, 0.04 0.40 A = 2:745, B = 0:33,  = 0:647
 = 1:4,  = 1:0, 0.04 0.40 A = 3:445, B = 0:305,  = 0:724
 = 1:0,  = 1:0, 0.04 0.40 A = 3:75, B = 0:375,  = 1:197
 = 1:0,  = 0:6, 0.04 0.40 A = 3:875, B = 0:385,  = 1:22
 = 0:5,  = 0:3, 0.04 0.40 A = 4:58, B = 0:41,  = 1:45
4.2 Growth Eects of Taxation
We are now in a position to numerically investigate how various tax policies af-
fect the steady-state growth rate and how the magnitudes of the policy eects on
growth respond to the two elasticities of substitution in the nal goods and human
capital production sectors.
6For households' time allocation, see, for example, Prescott (1986) and Benhabib et al (1991).
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To obtain the numerical results, we rst solve the equation system (28) and (31)
for the balanced growth rate (g) and leisure (l) and then substitute these values
into the other equilibrium conditions to obtain the values of other variables. Ta-
bles 3, 5 and 7 report the results for dierent tax regimes in the rst three cases.7
Tables 4, 6 and 8 compare the percentage changes in the growth rate under dif-
ferent tax regimes.
Part I of each table compares the balanced growth solutions for the benchmark
economy with the solutions in a number of alternative tax regimes (equal per-
centage changes in taxes). Part II reports the results for three dierent changes
in the tax regime that provide a present value of tax revenue equivalent to that
provided by imposing a 10% tax (i.e., k = l =  = 0:1) on both capital and
labor income (revenue-equivalent changes in taxes). The rst row in each table
illustrates the eect of eliminating all distortional taxation (the benchmark case).
The subsequent rows vary the tax rates in order to see the dierent tax eects on
the growth rate and other variables.
Table 3: Balanced Growth Solution in Case (i)
 = 1:0,  = 1:0, A = 3:75, B = 0:375,  = 1:197
c k l g l r  e=k c=k y=k C=Y E=Y
I Equal Percentage Changes in Taxes
0 0 0 0.040 0.40 0.21 0.60 0.12 0.39 0.63 0.62 0.19
0 0 0.2 0.025 0.46 0.18 0.59 0.09 0.35 0.54 0.65 0.16
0 0.2 0 0.035 0.41 0.25 0.60 0.14 0.49 0.75 0.65 0.19
0 0.2 0.2 0.021 0.47 0.21 0.59 0.10 0.44 0.64 0.68 0.16
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes in Taxes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0.162 0 0 0.035 0.43 0.20 0.60 0.12 0.37 0.60 0.62 0.19
0 0.300 0 0.033 0.42 0.28 0.60 0.16 0.56 0.84 0.67 0.19
0 0 0.150 0.029 0.45 0.19 0.59 0.09 0.36 0.56 0.64 0.17
0 0.1 0.1 0.031 0.44 0.21 0.60 0.11 0.41 0.64 0.65 0.17
7The results for the last two cases are reported in the Appendix (Tables 11-14).
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Table 4: Percentage Changes in the Growth Rate in Case (i)
c k l g g g=g
I Equal Percentage Changes in Taxes
0 0 0 0.04004
0 0 0.2 0.02508 -0.01496
-0.37371
0 0.2 0 0.03519 -0.00485
-0.12107
0 0.2 0.2 0.02077 -0.01927
-0.48136
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes in Taxes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0 0 0 0.04004
0.16154 0 0 0.03484 -0.00520
-0.12989
0 0.29994 0 0.03261 -0.00743
-0.18564
0 0 0.15001 0.02898 -0.01106
-0.27618
0 0.1 0.1 0.03052 -0.00952
-0.23781
Table 3 reports the impact of a rise in the income tax to 20% as well as of separate
rises in wage and capital taxes. We have the following results: (i) Both the labor
and capital income taxes reduce the growth rate; (ii) For both equal percentage
and revenue-equivalent changes, the labor income tax has a larger negative eect
on growth than the capital income tax. Table 4 shows that, for equal percentage
changes, when the labor (capital) income tax l (k) increases from 0 to 20%, the
growth rate decreases by 37.4% (12.1%). Similarly, for revenue-equivalent changes,
when the labor (capital) income tax l (k) increases from 0 to 15% (30%), the
growth rate decreases by 27.6% (18.6%).8
Table 3 also reports the changes in the other variables under dierent tax regimes.
For example, both the labor and capital income taxes increase leisure (and thus
8For revenue-equivalent changes, the consumption tax has the smallest negative eect on
growth. When the consumption tax increases from 0 to 16.2%, the growth rate drops by 13.0%.
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decrease labor supply), but the labor income tax raises leisure by more than the
capital income tax; The labor income tax discourages investment in education
while the capital income tax discourages investment in physical capital; Both the
labor and capital income taxes encourage consumption. Also, as in Devereux and
Love (1994), there are only small changes in the value of . Although labor in-
put in human capital production is not subject to taxes, the only use of human
capital is for nal goods production which is taxed. That is, labor in nal goods
production is taxed now while labor in human capital production will be taxed
in the future. As a result, taxes do have large eects on the allocation of labor
between the two activities.
Table 5: Balanced Growth Solution in Case (ii)
 = 0:5,  = 0:3, A = 4:58, B = 0:41,  = 1:45
c k l g l r  e=k c=k y=k C=Y E=Y
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.040 0.40 0.21 0.54 0.31 1.27 1.70 0.75 0.18
0 0 0.2 0.026 0.46 0.18 0.54 0.26 1.21 1.58 0.77 0.17
0 0.2 0 0.038 0.41 0.26 0.54 0.34 1.42 1.88 0.76 0.18
0 0.2 0.2 0.024 0.47 0.22 0.55 0.29 1.35 1.75 0.77 0.17
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0.134 0 0 0.035 0.43 0.20 0.54 0.30 1.24 1.66 0.75 0.18
0 0.809 0 0.023 0.46 0.92 0.55 0.66 2.80 3.56 0.79 0.18
0 0 0.114 0.032 0.43 0.19 0.54 0.28 1.24 1.63 0.76 0.17
0 0.1 0.1 0.032 0.43 0.22 0.54 0.30 1.31 1.72 0.76 0.17
Tables 5 and 6 report the results for Case (ii), in which both the elasticity of sub-
stitution in nal goods production () and the elasticity of substitution in human
capital production () are less than unity. As in Case (i), both the labor and
capital income taxes lower the growth rate and, for equal percentage change, the
labor income tax reduces the growth rate by more than the capital income tax.
When the labor (capital) income tax l (k) increases from 0 to 20%, the growth
rate decreases by 36.1% (4.4%). However, unlike Case (i), for revenue-equivalent
26
Table 6: Percentage Changes in the Growth Rate in Case (ii)
c k l g g g=g
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.04001
0 0 0.2 0.02556 -0.01445
-0.36117
0 0.2 0 0.03824 -0.00177
-0.04431
0 0.2 0.2 0.02397 -0.01604
-0.40093
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes ( Equivalent to =0.1)
0 0 0 0.04001
0.13358 0 0 0.03524 -0.00477
-0.11924
0 0.80885 0 0.02314 -0.01687
-0.42166
0 0 0.11411 0.03211 -0.00790
-0.19750
0 0.1 0.1 0.03235 -0.00767
-0.19159
changes, the capital income tax has a stronger eect on growth than the labor
income tax. When the labor (capital) income tax l (k) increases from 0 to 11.4%
(80.9%), the growth rate decreases by 19.8% (42.2%). We can see that reducing
the elasticities of substitution tends to weaken the distortionary eects of taxation
on growth.9
Tables 7 and 8 contain the results for Case (iii), in which both the elasticity of
substitution in nal goods production () and the elasticity of substitution in hu-
man capital production () are greater than unity. As in Case (ii), both the labor
and capital income taxes reduce the growth rate and, for both equal percentage
and revenue-equivalent changes, the labor income tax reduces the growth rate
by more than the capital income tax. We also nd that increasing the elasticities
9A revenue-equivalent change in the capital income tax is an exception due to the very high
tax rate resulting from a much smaller tax base.
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Table 7: Balanced Growth Solution in Case (iii)
 = 1:5,  = 1:1, A = 2:745, B = 0:33,  = 0:647
c k l g l r  e=k c=k y=k C=Y E=Y
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.040 0.40 0.21 0.62 0.028 0.15 0.30 0.51 0.09
0 0 0.2 0.027 0.49 0.18 0.61 0.016 0.13 0.25 0.50 0.06
0 0.2 0 0.031 0.40 0.24 0.61 0.040 0.22 0.37 0.59 0.11
0 0.2 0.2 0.019 0.49 0.21 0.60 0.023 0.18 0.30 0.59 0.08
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0.196 0 0 0.035 0.45 0.20 0.61 0.28 0.50 0.08
0 0.144 0 0.033 0.40 0.23 0.61 0.04 0.20 0.35 0.57 0.10
0 0 0.329 0.018 0.57 0.17 0.61 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.49 0.05
0 0.1 0.1 0.029 0.44 0.21 0.61 0.03 0.17 0.30 0.55 0.08
Table 8: Percentage Changes in the Growth Rate in Case (iii)
c k l g g g=g
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.04002
0 0 0.2 0.02734 -0.01268
-0.31687
0 0.2 0 0.03105 -0.00897
-0.22416
0 0.2 0.2 0.01862 -0.02140
-0.53470
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0 0 0 0.04002
0.19617 0 0 0.03457 -0.00545
-0.30872
0 0.14373 0 0.03342 -0.00660
-0.16486
0 0 0.32866 0.01778 -0.02224
-0.55576
0 0.1 0.1 0.02932 -0.01069
-0.26720
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of substitution tends to strengthen the distortionary eects of taxation on growth.
The results for the last two cases are reported in the Appendix (Tables 11-14).
These results give us more or less the same information about the impact of tax-
ation and the role of the two elasticities of substitution as those in the rst three
cases. All the ve cases will be discussed in next subsection.
4.3 The Role of Elasticities of Substitution
In this subsection, we will briey discuss the connection between the elasticities
of substitution and the growth eects of taxation.
Tables 9 and 10 compare the impacts on growth of equal percentage and revenue
equivalent changes in taxes.
Table 9: Growth Eects of Equal Percentage Changes in Taxes
c k l  = 0:5  = 1  = 1  = 1:4  = 1:5
 = 0:3  = 0:6  = 1  = 1  = 1:1
0 0 0.2 -0.36117 -0.34480 -0.37371 -0.31203 -0.31687
0 0.2 0 -0.04436 -0.10570 -0.12107 -0.21485 -0.22416
0 0.2 0.2 -0.40093 -0.44406 -0.48136 -0.51991 -0.53470
From Table 9, we can easily see that the negative eects of factor income taxes on
growth are stronger when the two elasticities of substitution between inputs are
higher. That is, when the elasticities of substitution are high, the factor impacts
are more substitutable. As a result, the taxes have stronger distortionary eects
on the inter-sectoral allocation of resources, leading to lager changes in the rate
of return on investment and in the growth rate.
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The labor income tax has a larger eect on growth than the capital income tax.
The reason is as follows, the growth rate depends on the rate of return on invest-
ment in physical and human capital. All the taxes we consider here reduce the
rate of return on investment. The relative size of the growth eect of factor taxes
on the rate of return on investment is positively related to the factor share in nal
goods production. Under our parameterization, the share of human capital is 2=3.
As a result, for equal percentage changes, the labor income tax has a larger growth
eect than the capital income tax.
Table 10: Growth Eects of Revenue-Equivalent Changes in Taxes
 = 0:1  = 0:5  = 1  = 1  = 1:4  = 1:5
 = 0:3  = 0:6  = 1  = 1  = 1:1
c -0.11924 -0.12642 -0.12989 -0.13360 -0.13615
k -0.42166 -0.16274 -0.18564 -0.16558 -0.16486
l -0.19750 -0.25336 -0.27618 -0.47402 -0.55576
k = l = 0:1 -0.19159 -0.21593 -0.23781 -0.25905 -0.26720
As in Table 9, Table 10 also shows that, with higher elasticites of substitution,
factor income taxes have stronger impacts on growth for the same reason as ex-
plained above.
For revenue-equivalent changes, the ranking of the taxes in terms of the growth
eects depends on the elasticities of substitution. When the elasticities are low,
the capital income tax has a larger eect on growth than the labor income tax;
when the elasticities are high, the opposite is true. The consumption tax always
has the smallest negative eect on growth.
For revenue-equivalent changes, the growth eect of a tax depends on two factors:
(i) the relative size of the negative growth eect of the tax. (The labor income
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tax has a larger negative eect than the capital income tax.) (ii) the relative size
of the tax base. (The capital income tax base is in general smaller than the labor
income tax base; As a result,the capital income tax rate has to be higher than
the labor income tax rate.) For revenue-equivalent changes, when the elastici-
ties are low, the second factor dominates, the smaller base of the capital income
tax leads to the capital income tax being more harmful to growth than the labor
income tax. When the elasticities are high, the rst factor dominates, therefore
the labor income tax reduces the growth rate by more than the capital income tax.
5 Conclusions
In the thesis, we have developed a general two sector endogenous growth model
and numerically investigated how various tax policies aect economic growth and
how these growth eects respond to changes in the elasticities of substitution in
the two sectors.
Under reasonable parameterization, we nd that the negative eects of taxation
on economic growth are stronger when the elasticities of substitution between in-
puts in the two sectors are higher. When the elasticities of substitution are low,
the production factors are less substitutable. As a result, the distortions created
by taxes tend to be relatively small. When the elasticities of substitution are high,
the production factors are more substitutable. therefore, taxes generate relatively
large distortions. These results are in sharp contrast with those in the literature. 10
We also nd that, for equal percentage changes, the labor income tax is more
10For example, Stokey and Rebelo (1995) argue that the elasticities of substitution in produc-
tion are not critical for growth eects. Many studies empoly Cobb-Douglas production functions
in all sectors to examine policy issues.
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harmful to growth than the capital income tax. This result conrms the nding
in Devereux and Love (1994).
Another important nding in this thesis is that, for revenue equivalent changes,
the ranking of the taxes in terms of their impact on growth depends on the elastic-
ities of substitutions in the two sectors. When the elasticities are low, the capital
income tax has a lager negative eect on growth than the labor income tax; When
the elasticities are high, the opposite is true.
We believe that our ndings help us to further understand the impact of tax poli-
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Appendix
I. Numerical results for Case (iv) (  = 1:4 and  = 1).
Table 11: Balanced Growth Solution in Case (iv)
 = 1:4,  = 1, A = 3:445, B = 0:305,  = 0:724
c k l g l r  e=k c=k y=k C=Y E=Y
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.040 0.40 0.21 0.60 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.53 0.10
0 0 0.2 0.028 0.48 0.19 0.59 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.53 0.07
0 0.2 0 0.031 0.41 0.25 0.60 0.04 0.23 0.39 0.60 0.11
0 0.2 0.2 0.019 0.49 0.21 0.59 0.03 0.19 0.32 0.61 0.08
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0.190 0 0 0.035 0.45 0.20 0.60 0.03 0.15 0.30 0.52 0.09
0 0.152 0 0.033 0.41 0.23 0.60 0.04 0.21 0.37 0.58 0.11
0 0 0.292 0.021 0.52 0.17 0.59 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.52 0.06
0 0.1 0.1 0.030 0.44 0.21 0.59 0.03 0.18 0.32 0.57 0.09
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Table 12: Percentage Changes in the Growth Rate in Case (iv)
c k l g g g=g
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.04001
0 0 0.2 0.02752 -0.01248
-0.31203
0 0.2 0 0.03141 -0.00860
-0.21485
0 0.2 0.2 0.01921 -0.02080
-0.51991
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0 0 0 0.04001
0.18998 0 0 0.03466 -0.00535
-0.13360
0 0.15205 0 0.03338 -0.00662
-0.16558
0 0 0.29211 0.02104 -0.01896
-0.47402
0 0.1 0.1 0.02964 -0.01036
-0.25905
II. Numerical results for Case (v) (  = 1 and  = 0:6).
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Table 13: Balanced Growth Solution in Case (v)
 = 1,  = 0:6, A = 3:875, B = 0:385,  = 1:22
c k l g l r  e=k c=k y=k C=Y E=Y
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.040 0.40 0.21 0.56 0.10 0.41 0.63 0.66 0.15
0 0 0.2 0.026 0.46 0.18 0.55 0.07 0.37 0.55 0.68 0.13
0 0.2 0 0.036 0.41 0.25 0.56 0.12 0.52 0.76 0.69 0.16
0 0.2 0.2 0.022 0.47 0.22 0.55 0.09 0.46 0.65 0.71 0.14
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0.152 0 0 0.035 0.43 0.20 0.55 0.09 0.39 0.60 0.66 0.15
0 0.300 0 0.034 0.42 0.28 0.56 0.14 0.60 0.84 0.71 0.16
0 0 0.150 0.030 0.44 0.19 0.55 0.08 0.38 0.57 0.67 0.14
0 0.1 0.1 0.031 0.44 0.21 0.56 0.09 0.44 0.64 0.68 0.14
Table 14: Percentage Changes in the Growth Rate in Case (v)
c k l g g g=g
I Equal Percentage Changes
0 0 0 0.04003
0 0 0.2 0.02623 -0.01380
-0.34480
0 0.2 0 0.03580 -0.00423
-0.10570
0 0.2 0.2 0.02226 -0.01778
-0.44406
II Revenue-Equivalent Changes (Equivalent to =0.1)
0 0 0 0.04003
0.15220 0 0 0.03497 -0.00506
-0.12642
0 0.30006 0 0.03352 -0.00651
-0.16274
0 0 0.14999 0.02989 -0.01014
-0.25336
0 0.1 0.1 0.03139 -0.00865
-0.21597
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